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Special Allocations of




The United States taxes its citizens and corporations currently on all
income from foreign sources but allows a credit against the U.S. tax for
foreign taxes paid on the income. In general, the foreign tax credit
permits a dollar-for-dollar offset against the U.S. tax otherwise payable,
but the Internal Revenue Code limits the credit to foreign taxes
imposed at an effective rate not in excess of the U.S. tax rate on the
income. In short, the foreign tax credit requires the taxpayer to pay the
higher of the U.S. rate or the foreign rate on his foreign source
income. Each taxpayer who pays creditable foreign income taxes may
elect either to deduct those taxes or to credit them. He cannot deduct
them if he elects the foreign tax credit. Furthermore, he cannot elect to
credit some foreign income taxes and deduct others. The election,
which is made anew each taxable year, must apply to all creditable taxes
paid or accrued during that year to all foreign countries. The partner-
ship form of enterprise may permit flexibility in the use of the foreign
tax credit.
The Code generally treats a partnership' as a "conduit" and requires
* A.B. 1963, Dartmouth College; LL.B. 1966, Harvard University; Associate Professor
of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. § 7701(a)(2) (all section references are to the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954) defines
"partnership" as "a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated
organization, through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture
is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or a
corporation . . . " Treas. Regs. §§ 301.7701-2 (1960) (as amended) and 301.7701-3
(1960) (as amended) identify those factors which distinguish a partnership from an
unincorporated "association" which is treated as a "corporation" for purposes of the
Code.
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the partners to report their own shares of the partnership's items of
income, credit2 and deduction. The partnership entity must itself make
most elections affecting the computation of taxable income. The Code,
however, provides an exception in the case of a partner's distributive
share of foreign income taxes paid or accrued by the partnership
during the taxable year. Under section 703(b), the partners, rather
than the partnership, may individually elect to credit or deduct such
foreign income taxes.4 Section 901(b)(5) permits a partner of a partner-
ship paying or accruing a foreign income tax to take the foreign tax
credit in much the same manner that he is entitled to take other
pass-through credits and deductions.
As part of the "conduit" view of partnerships in the Code, sections
704(a) and (b) provide.that partners may agree upon special allocations
of the partnership's items of income, deduction and credit, including
foreign income taxes,5 in a manner different from the ratio for sharing
losses and profits generally, so long as such special allocations do not
have as their principal purpose the avoidance or evasion of federal
income taxes.6 In the absence of either a special allocation agreement
or the requisite non-tax purpose, the partners must allocate foreign
taxes in the same proportions as they allocate the partnership's profit
and loss, 7 as provided in the partnership agreement and reflected in
the partnership's books of account.
With proper planning, special partnership allocations may represent
a device whereby an international joint venture can maximize the
utility of its foreign tax payments by allocating foreign tax credits to the
U.S. partner who can most benefit from them. It should be obvious
that such a partnership arrangement would be an attractive vehicle for
international joint ventures. Surprisingly, neither the regulations8 nor
2. §§ 33 and 901 allow U.S. citizens and domestic corporations to elect to credit
foreign "income, war profits, and excess profits taxes" [hereinafter "foreign income
taxes"], if the taxpayer chooses.
3. Although § 164(a)(3) allows a deduction for foreign income taxes in the computa-
tion of taxable income, § 275(a)(4) explicitly provides that no such deduction is allowed if
the taxpayer has elected to credit foreign income taxes under § 901.
4. "Foreign income taxes" generally include foreign levies imposed on a base which
resembles the U.S. concept of "taxable income" in § 63, Biddle v. Conm'r, 302 U.S. 573
(1938), as well as certain taxes imposed "in lieu" of general levies, § 903. See generally E.




8. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956) (as amended), Example (2) deals with the
allocation of more than a prorata share of foreign income to a partner who is a resident
of a foreign country.
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any judicial or administrative decisions specifically address the problem
of whether partners might provide for non-prorata. allocations of a
partnership's foreign taxes while simultaneously passing the tax avoid-
ance test of section 704(b)(2). 9 This state of the art is not too
surprising in view of the dearth of authority and commentary'0 with
respect to special partnership allocations generally.
This article will explore the problem by analyzing such allocations
under the avoidance test of section 704(b)(2), the regulations thereun-
der, and relevant decisions and legislative history; by extending to the
foreign tax credit context a recent seminal analysis of allocations of
deductions and losses by real estate partnerships;" and by advancing,
on the basis of such analysis, several tentative proposals for making
valid allocations in the international joint venture setting.
I
THE SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC EFFECT TEST
Section 704(b)(2) denies effect to an allocation provision in the
partnership agreement which has as its principal purpose the avoid-
ance or evasion of federal income taxes. The regulations thereunder
generally provide that, in determining what constitutes avoidance or
evasion, consideration should be given to all "the surrounding facts and
circumstances."' 2 While the question of whether the allocation has
"substantial economic effect"'3 is only one of several specifically enum-
9. While some cases, e.g. Arundel Corp. v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 1019 (Ct. Cl.
1952); Badger Co., T.C. Memo 1967-178, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 869, 36 P-H Tax CL
Mem. 67-949 (1967); and some rulings, e.g. Rev. Rul. 75-19, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 2,
at 18; Rev. Rul. 75-23, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 3, at 33 have dealt generally with
partnerships in international trade and investment contexts, no decisional authority
governs the special allocation issue.
10. E.g., A. WILLIS, WILLIS ON PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 19 (1971); Anderson and
Bloom, Of Battles Yet to be Fought: The Allocation of Partnership Deduction, 2 J. RE.AL ESTATE
TAx. 32 (1974); Boone, Partnership Taxation: The Allocation of Specific Items of Income and
Loss Under the 1954 Code, 20 SW. L.J. 840 (1966); Driscoll, Tax Problems of Partnerships-
Special Allocation of Specific Items, U. So. CAL. 1958 TAX INST. 421; HOWE, Computation of
Partnership and Partner's Income; Allocation of Special Items; Treatment of Losses; Elections and
Credits; Techniques of Handling Tax Audit of Partnership, N.Y.U. 28TH INST. ON FED. TAx.
521 (1970); McKee, Partnership Allocations in Real Estate Ventures: Crane, Kresser, and
Orrisch, 30 TAx L. REv. 1 (1975). The principal items which focus on the allocation of
the foreign tax credit are E. OWENS, supra note 4; Owens and Forry, Can the Foreign Tax
Credit Benefit be Shifted by Agreement? 31 J. TAx. 160 (1969).
11. McKee, supra note 10.
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956) (as amended) (second sentence).
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956) (as amended).
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erated "facts and circumstances" to be considered, it is generally agreed
to be the single most important factor in determining the validity of a
special allocation under section 704(b)(2). The legislative history of sec-
tion 704 supports this consensus.
Both section 704(b)(2) and the phrase "substantial economic effect"
first appeared in 1954.14 As approved by the Ways and Means Commit-
tee and as passed by the House of Representatives, section 704 of H.R.
.8300 allowed special allocations only if not principally tax-motivated.
While the Senate approved H.R. 8300 without changing the substantive
language of sections 704(a) or (b), the report of the Senate Finance
Committee added to the House report the following explanatory
paragraph:
Where, however, a provision in a partnership agreement for a special allocation
of certain items has substantial economic effect and is not merely a device for
reducing' the taxes of certain partners without actually affecting the shares of
partnership income, then such a provision will be recognized for tax purposes.15
(Emphasis added.)
The Senate Report then illustrated a permissible special allocation by
means of a partnership agreement which allocated to a partner resi-
dent in Puerto Rico a percentage of the income derived from Puerto
Rican sources which was greater than the partner's distributive share of
income generally. 16
Against such a valid allocation, the Senate Report contrasted, in one
instance, an allocation that merely reduced taxes "without actually
affecting the [partners'] shares of partnership income," and in an-
other, an allocation of an exemption that had no "real economic
effect on either partner's share of the total partnership income."17 In
both instances, the validity of the allocation depended upon its affect-
ing the partners' income shares before considering tax consequences.
Elaborating on this theme, the regulations state that an allocation has
substantial economic effect if "the allocation may actually affect the
dollar amount of the partners' share of the total partnership income or
loss independently of tax consequences. '" Conversely, a special alloca-
tion will not have substantial economic effect if the partners each would
14. The language of § 704(b) first appeared in H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954),
which went on to become the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See H. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. A223 (1954).
15. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954).
16. Id. at 379.
17. Id. at 379.
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956) (as amended).
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receive the same total of dollars that they would have received if no
special allocation had been made.
Thus, whether a special allocation has an economic effect is deter-
minable in most cases by inquiring whether the special allocation
increases or decreases the total number of dollars a partner will receive
(other than by way of. tax deductions and the like). That is, would he
receive, absent tax effects, the same amount of dollars if there were no
special allocation? If he would, then the allocation does not have an
economic effect. Even a favorable determination under this test, how-
ever, will not guarantee an allocation's validity. As the structure of the
regulations under section 704(b) indicates, and as most commentators
agree, the substantial economic effect test is probably only a threshold
inquiry. While failure to comply is certainly fatal, an allocation might
fail despite compliance, if principally tax motivated.
A. THE MCKEE ANALYSIS: THE ANALOGY OF SPECIAL
ALLOCATIONS OF DEPRECIATION DEDUCTIONS
IN A REAL ESTATE PARTNERSHIP
Professor William S. McKee's recent analysis of special partnership
allocations of real estate depreciation deductions makes a valuable
contribution to the understanding of section 704(b). Professor McKee
demonstrates how the recent cases of Jean V. Kresser19 and Orrisch v.
Commissioner20 implicitly define and clarify the "substantial economic
effect" test. In Orrisch, the partnership agreement was amended to
allocate to the taxpayer 100 percent of the depreciation for the taxable
year because he was in a high tax bracket and his partner could not use
the depreciation deduction that year. The partnership agreement was
oral, and the Tax Court first had to determine the provisions of the
agreement. The Court concluded that the agreement between Orrisch
and his partner was to share all items of partnership gain or loss, cash
flow, and liabilities on a 50-50 basis, except for the tax allocations of
depreciation during the taxable year in question and, in the case of
sale, except for a like allocation to Orrisch of an amount of gain equal
to such depreciation. Since the cash distributable at any time, including
19. Jean V. Kresser, 54 T.C. 1621 (1970).
20. Orrisch v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 395 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 31 AM. FED. TAX REP. 2d
73-1069 (9th Cir. 1973); accord, Leon A. Harris, Jr., 61 T.C. 770, [1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH TAX CT. REP. No. 83, Dec. 32,500, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MFm. DEC. 61.83 (1974).
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upon liquidation of the partnership, remained 50-50 notwithstanding
the allocation of that year's depreciation to Orrisch, it appeared that
the allocation would have had no economic effect at all in the event the
partnership sold the depreciable property at a loss. In no way did it
impair Orrisch's right to receive at any time exactly one-half of all
dollars paid to the partners by the partnership.
The Tax Court noted that the allocation would have no effect if the
partnership assets were sold at a profit because the disproportionate
allocation to Orrisch of an amount of gain equal to the amount of
depreciation previously allocated to him disproportionately would then
leave Orrisch entitled to receive the same 50 percent of the cash from
the partnership as though neither depreciation nor gain had been
allocated specially. In the case of a sale of the partnership property at a
loss, however, the allocation of depreciation to Orrisch was without
economic effect and was clearly inconsistent with the economic sub-
stance of the agreement to share the cash 50-50. The agreement would
have permitted Orrisch to take his proportionate (50 percent) share of
the proceeds, rather than requiring him to accept a reduced share
owing to his reduced capital account. In short, had Orrisch's agreement
complied with the court's suggestion that he suffer a disproportionate
share of any cash loss, reflecting the depreciation specially allocated to
him, the court would have upheld the special allocation of deprecia-
tion.
The Orrisch rule, according to Professor McKee, is simply that "one
partner cannot take a tax loss which in economic terms is being borne
by another partner. A divergence between tax and economic conse-
quences for any period of time means that the rule has been vio-
lated. '21 Professor McKee's analysis of the "substantial economic effect"
test, consistent with Orrisch, asks, in effect, whether the partner receiv-
ing the specially allocated item of deduction will actually bear the
corresponding economic loss, in the form of a reduced share of the
proceeds, if the partnership project is sold at any point in time. If so,
the allocation has substantial economic effect, and the taxpayer has at
least survived the threshold inquiry of the section 704(b)(2) tax avoid-
ance test. This analysis may be applied to the special allocation of
foreign tax payments by an international joint venture.
Two factors suggest that this analysis bears on special allocations of
foreign tax payments. First, determination of the economic effects of a
provision allocating foreign tax payments involves similar, but less
complex, considerations than those of a provision allocating depreciation
21. McKee, supra note 10, at 20.
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and other deduction items, which was the primary focus of Professor
McKee's article. In each situation, for example, an allocation need not
have an immediate impact on amounts distributed to a partner as his
share of current cash flow. Undistributed income may be credited and
losses may be charged directly to the capital accounts of the respective
partners. In each case, such credits and charges will simply affect the
total number of dollars ultimately to be received by a particular partner
from the partnership and thereby meet the regulation's definition of
"substantial economic effect." In the case of the real estate partnership,
however, which in its early years typically suffers net tax losses as a
result of accelerated depreciation, prepaid interest and other factors,
negative capital accounts present special section 704 problems, and
Professor McKee's article necessarily discusses them at some length.
22
In contrast, the parties to an international joint venture will generally
not anticipate net losses and negative capital accounts in the early
period of operation. While such possibilities should not be ignored,
they are certainly far less important in the international joint venture
than in the domestic real estate investment setting.
A second factor suggesting the relevance of Professor McKee's
analysis of allocation of deductions to allocations of foreign taxes lies in
the general distinction between a "deduction" and a "credit. '23 Al-
though the partnership regulations are silent, the investment credit
regulations do recognize the possibility of validly allocating the invest-
ment credit among partners by special agreement,2 4 provided the
agreement allocates all related items of income and deduction in the
same manner.25 By analogy, 26 one might apply this same principle to
the foreign tax credit area, permitting the partnership to allocate
foreign tax payments to a partner only if he receives an allocation of all
the foreign income on which the tax was imposed.2 7 This analogy
should fail, however, because it overlooks a fundamental difference
between the investment credit and the foreign tax credit. The invest-
ment credit never represents an item of deduction. The credit claimed
22. Id. at 37-45.
23. In general, a "deduction" is subtracted from "gross income" in arriving at "taxable
income," the base to which the tax rate schedule applies in determining the tax due. See
§§ 61 and 63. A "credit," on the other hand, is subtracted directly from the amount of
the tax due. See §§ 31-42.
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.46-3(0(2) (1964) (as amended).
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.46-3(f)(2)(ii) (1964) (as amended).
26. This analogy would seem to have some force, since the investment credit regula-
tions are the only illustration in the regulations of a special allocation of a credit item.
27. Example (2) of Treas. Reg. § 1.704(b)(2) (1956) (as amended) deals only with a
non prorata allocation of foreign income, not the related foreign taxes.
1975]
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does not even reduce the basis of the property for computing deprecia-
tion.28 In contrast, foreign taxes eligible to be credited are merely items
of deduction in the absence of an affirmative election to claim the
payments as a credit against the taxpayer's U.S. taxes.29 This difference
between the irivestment credit and the foreign tax credit, based upon
the similarity of foreign tax payments and deductions generally,
strongly suggests that one should test the economic effect of a special
allocation of foreign tax payments under the criteria applicable to
special allocations of items of deduction, rather than under the special
investment credit rules. Accordingly, Professor McKee's analysis, which
focuses on the validity of special allocations of deductions, seems
particularly relevant to an analysis of special allocations of foreign tax
payments.
B. APPLICATION OF THE MCKEE ANALYSIS TO A
HYPOTHETICAL INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE
Assume a U.S. corporation and a French corporation form a
partnership to carry on a joint venture for the production of hydrogen
gas in a Middle Eastern country. The parties agree to allocate all items
of income and deduction on a 50-50 basis, except that the agreement
allocates all foreign income taxes imposed on the partnership to the
U.S. partner. In the first year of operation, the joint venture realizes
gross revenues of $100 million, incurs current operating expenses of
$50 million, and pays foreign income taxes of $10 million on its net
income. Under the terms of the partnership agreement, 30 the U.S.
partner will report the following distributive shares of the partneiship's
income and deductions: ("000" omitted)
Sales $50,000
Current Operating Expenses -25,000
Taxable Income 25,000
U.S. Tax Rate x 48%
Tentative U.S. Tax 12,000
Foreign Tax Credit - 10,000
Net U.S. Tax $ 2,000
28. § 48(g), which required a reduction of basis for investment credit claimed, was
repealed by Act of Feb. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 203(a)(1), 78 Stat. 33, effective
Dec. 31, 1963.
29. §§ 164(a)(3) and 901.
30. Pursuant to § 704(a), the partners have agreed to a 50-50 split of all items except
foreign income taxes.
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The special allocations of expenses (50-50) and taxes (100-0) initially
reduce the U.S. partner's capital account by $35 million-$25 million
of expenses and $10 million of taxes. The U.S. partner's $50 million
share of the sales income, however, would make for a net increase of
$15 million in the U.S. partner's capital account for the year. The
French partner's capital account would increase by $25 million, its
share of the taxable income of the partnership. Upon a sale of the
partnership venture, the U.S. partner would receive a reduced share of
the proceeds to the extent of its special allocation of foreign tax
payments. Suppose, for example, that each partner's initial capital
contribution consisted of $100 million in cash. At the end of the first
year, the U.S. partner's capital account would be $115 million, while
the French partner's capital account would be $125 million. If the
partnership sold its assets for $240 million and liquidated at that point,
the U.S. partner would receive $10 million less than the French partner
and thus bear the burden of the foreign tax allocated to it. According-
ly, the special allocation of the foreign tax payments would pass the
Orrisch test and otherwise satisfy Professor McKee's requirement that
the allocation have substantial economic effect.
II
THE TAX AVOIDANCE TEST
The validity of special allocations of the foreign tax credit may also
depend upon the ability of the taxpayer to ascertain the factors which
determine the presence or absence of a tax avoidance purpose. As
noted above, the substantial economic effect test may well be merely a
threshold inquiry and the taxpayer must in addition prove that no tax
avoidance motive is present.31 The legislative history of section
704(b)(2) supports this conclusion, but contributes little clarification.
The report of the Committee on Ways and Means, for example, in
explaining section 704(b) of the House Bill, states:
For example, if the provisions of a partnership agreement... allocate a greater
portion of the foreign tax credit to one partner than to another partner, such
provisions may be disregarded, and such items attributed to all the partners in
accordance with the provisions of the partnership agreement for.sharing income
or losses.'
2
31. E.g., 2 S. SuRREY, W. WARREN, P. McDONALD & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 24, 26-27 (1973); Freeman, Partnership Formation and Sale or Transfer Under the
1954 Code, 11 TAX L. REv. 1, 6 (1955).
32. H. RaP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A223 (1954).
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This example offers no guidance beyond the suggestion that any
disproportionate allocation of foreign taxes may be invalid. The report
of the Senate Finance Committee restates this example but elaborates
on it by specifying that the partnership agreement allocates to the other
partners an amount of other partnership losses or deductions equiva-
lent to the amount of foreign taxes allocated to the one partner. The
Senate report states that such obvious efforts to 'Juggle" tax items
through a special allocation should be disregarded for income tax
purposes. 33
Whether a particular allocation is principally tax-motivated depends,
according to the section 704 regulations, on "the surrounding facts and
circumstances." While most observers regard the economic effect of the
allocation to be the most significant factor, the regulations enumerate
five additional "facts and circumstances" to be considered in determin-
ing whether the prohibited tax-avoidance purpose exists:
(a) the overall tax consequences of the allocation;
(b) the duration of the allocation;
(c) whether the allocation was made without recognition of normal
business factors and only after the amount of the specifically
allocated item could reasonably be estimated;
(d) whether related items of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit
from the same source are subject to the same allocation; and
(e) whether the partnership or a partner individually has a business
purpose for the allocation.
34
First, it is difficult to perceive how an allocation's "overall tax con-
sequences" can represent a meaningful test, inasmuch as the overall
effect of virtually every special allocation will be a reduction in taxes. A
special allocation of foreign income taxes may often be inconsistent
with the purpose of the foreign tax credit-avoiding "double
taxation"--but this would not seem to affect the technical application of
this test or the others.
Second, the factor concerning the duration of the allocation can
readily be covered by careful drafting. In Kresser, the Tax Court
rejected a special allocation that was effective for only one year where it
was clear that in subsequent years the parties would reverse the
allocation and restore the partners to their initial arrangement. The
allocation invalidated in Orrisch was also short-term. Since the longer-
33. S. REP'. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954).
34. Trgas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956) (as amended).
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lived the allocation, the less likely a tax-avoidance purpose is present,
the partnership agreement should simply provide for the allocation on
a permanent basis. 35
The third factor primarily addresses situations in which the partners
know what the tax effect of the special allocation will be at the time
they adopt it, such as allocations made after the income has been
earned or, as in the Orrisch case, deductions for depreciation which do
not vary from year to year with the fortunes of the business. This
factor would seem much less likely to arise in an international joint
venture, where the amount and nature of future income, and hence its
liability for foreign taxes, is still reasonably uncertain at the time of
allocation.
The fourth factor is dealt with in I.A. above.
The foregoing review suggests that the enumerated criterion merit-
ing most serious attention, apart from economic effects, is the remain-
ing "business purpose" factor. This item is reminiscent of the tests
applied in such cases as Gregory v. Helvering,36 Knetsch v. United States37
and Gilbert v. Commissioner.38 The opinions in these cases indicate that
transactions motivated by a tax avoidance purpose and having no
economic substance will not be given tax recognition. An allocation to
one partner of a tax benefit, the economic cost of which that partner
cannot bear but which another partner will bear, would seem to
constitute the paradigm transaction prohibited by the Gregory-Knetsch-
Gilbert standard. In short, the "business purpose" test may overlap the
"economic effect" test to a great extent.
An example in the regulations dealing with the allocation of foreign
source income suggests an acceptable business purpose in a related
area.39 The example, which is grounded in the legislative history of
section 704(b),40 specifically notes that the partner to whom the alloca-
tion is made is a resident of the foreign country involved. In the
foreign tax credit context, the implication of this example is that
the foreign taxes and related foreign income from operations in a
35. Whatever the duration of the allocation, a fixed period of time would be illusory
because the parties could agree to modify it at any time. Indeed, in many cases one
partner could unilaterally terminate the allocation by terminating the entire partnership.
36. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
37. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
38. 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion by L. Hand), on remand T.C. Mem.
1958-8, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 29, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 58-23 (1958), affd, 262 F.2d
512 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956) (as amended), Example 2.
40. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954). See note 16 supra and
accompanying text.
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given foreign country could be allocated to a foreign partner resident
there. Since large corporations as partners would not ordinarily be
"residents" other than by their agents,4 1 a slightly revised test might be
required for multinational joint ventures. Realistically, most agents of
an international joint venture partnership would be employees solely of
the partnership, not of either venturer. A business purpose similar to
that illustrated in the regulations might be found, however, if the
partnership agreement assigned geographic areas of responsibility to
the respective partners. For example, if the hypothetical U.S.-French
partnership described above engaged in business in a high-tax foreign
country and a low-tax foreign country, the income taxes imposed by
the high-tax country might be allocated to the U.S. partner if it were
assigned primary responsibility for the operations conducted there. It
is unclear whether the assignment of managerial responsibilities would
be sufficient, or whether financial responsibility for losses incurred in
the operations conducted in the high-tax country would alsd be neces-
sary.42 It would seem logical to approve the latter allocation, since
essentially the same situation would obtain had the two partners indi-
vidually gone into the respective countries. Finally, assignment of the
tax reporting and compliance functions for the high-tax country to the
U.S. partner might also provide an adequate business purpose.
III
PARTNERSHIPS AS VEHICLES FOR DIRECT
INVESTMENTS ABROAD
A. IDEAL AND ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES
One potentially ideal structure would be a 50-50 joint venture
partnership between a U.S. corporation and an unrelated foreign
corporation, with all foreign taxes allocated to the U.S. partner, offset-
ting all U.S. taxes and reducing the U.S. partner's capital account as
required by the substantial economic effect test. Such a partnership
would offer a number of advantages in addition to the favorable
foreign tax credit result. For example, the entity would not produce
41. § 875(1) provides that a foreign corporation is considered to be engaged in a trade
or business within the United States if a partnership of which the corporation is a
member is so engaged.
42. The case law upholds special allocations to partners who apparently did not bear
the risk of loss, Andrew 0. Miller, Jr., 52 T.C. 752 (1969). Cf. Rev. Rul. 67-158, 1967-1
Cum. BULL. 188.
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subpart F income,43 even if the U.S. partner were found to be in
"control. '44 Subpart F, which taxes U.S. shareholders currently on
certain "tax haven" income from controlled foreign corporations, sim-
ply does not apply to partnerships.45
Also to be noted in the subpart F context, although its application is
less clear, is the character rule of section 702(b). Under this provision,
the character of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit
included in a partner's distributive share is to be determined at the
partnership level, as if directly realized or incurred by the partnership
itself rather than by the partner. If the U.S. investor participates in a
foreign partnership through a foreign subsidiary corporation, the
Treasury might try to find subpart F income in the hands of the
foreign corporate partner if the income realized at the partnership
level was similar to subpart F income. 46
Under section 1248, a United States shareholder of a controlled
foreign corporation may have to include in income as a dividend its
share of the earnings and profits of the corporation upon a taxable sale
or liquidation. Section 1248 would not apply to a U.S. partner's
disposition of its interest in an international joint venture. 47 The U.S.
partner could realize all capital gain when it disposed of its interest in
the partnership.48 Another issue as to the application of the character
rules would relate to the impact of sections 861 and 904 which deal,
respectively, with domestic source income criteria" and the per-country
and overall limitations on the foreign tax credit. It is unclear how the
partnership would be treated for purposes of applying the regulations
governing the allocation of deductions to foreign source income. 49 This
situation might, in turn, affect the computation of the section 904
limitation on the foreign tax credit of the U.S. partner.50
43. § 952(a) and § 954. Quaere whether a partnership would necessarily bring into play
the branch rule of § 954(d)(2) and cause the partnership to be treated as a separate
subsidiary corporation where a foreign corporation was the partner.
44. § 957(a) defines a "controlled" foreign corporation as a foreign corporation in
which the United States shareholders own more than 50 percent of the stock.
45. § 951(a).
46. One might argue that only those items of income and deduction specifically listed
in § 702(a), which does not list subpart F income, retain their character in the hands of
the partners.
47. § 1248(a) applies only to sales or exchanges of stock in a foreign corporation.
48. § 1221. Cf. § 751.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8 (1957) (as amended); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8, 38
Fed. Reg. 15840 (1973).
. 50. §§ 863(a) and 904.
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A variation on the joint venture form would be for a U.S. partner to
employ a 50-50 limited partnership for international operations with a
financial institution as the limited partner.51 Such an arrangement
might be attractive to an insurance company subject to a low rate of
income tax or to a credit institution which was in an excess foreign tax
credit position as a result of its other operations. In other words, the
special allocation of foreign tax payments could be attractive to a
partnership composed solely of domestic persons. The presence of a
foreign partner is by no means essential.
52
Another possibility for using partnerships in the international con-
text would be a partnership composed of a U.S. parent corporation
and its wholly-owned foreign subsidiary.5 3 It is unclear whether such a
partnership could permit the U.S. parent corporation to avoid the
consequences of subpart F54 and otherwise avoid having all the income
of the partnership taxed at the full U.S. rate as earned.5
B. FOREIGN TAX SYSTEMS
A foreign tax system which would make special allocations of the
foreign tax credit most attractive to the foreign partner of a U.S.
person would be one in which the special allocation has no tax effects.
In such a case, for example, the foreign partner might be able to claim
a credit for its pro rata share of the foreign taxes 1iaid by the
partnership, notwithstanding the special allocation. Or the foreign tax
system of the foreign partner's country might exempt its share of the
partnership income from current taxation. A similar result would
obtain if the foreign tax system exempted foreign source income. A
final possibility would be for a U.S. person to form a partnership with a
foreign government or foreign government corporation, which might
51. From the non-tax point of view such an arrangement might be justified as the
equivalent of a loan plus earnings participation in the venture, with the total return to the
limited partner fairly characterizable as "interest." Such an arrangement would help the
general partnei" claim a credit for all foreign income taxes imposed on the venture.
52. In general, the essence of the desirable set-up is to find a partner, of whatever
description, which is either not subject to U.S. tax or subject only to a low rate.
53. Cf. Rev. Rul. 75-19, 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 2, at 18 (holding valid a partnership
formed by four domestic subsidiaries of a domestic corporation, for the purpose of
purchasing a crude oil storage barge and chartering it to an unrelated corporation).
54. See note 46 supra.
55. While the Code literally would permit the subsidiary to report its share of the
income of the partnership, some imagination might be required to find a business
purpose for such a parent-subsidiary partnership.
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well be exempt from tax.56 In any event, the possible impact of foreign
withholding taxes imposed on the partners, as well as any foreign
income taxes imposed on the partnership as such, would have to be
kept in mind.
CONCLUSION
Special allocations of foreign income taxes to U.S. partners may well
be possible. The potential for tax savings would seem to be great,
though largely unexplored. If the suggestions advanced here can be
refined and applied in practice, the partnership should become an
increasingly popular vehicle for international joint ventures.
56. § 892 exempts from tax the income of foreign governments from sources within
the United States. See Rendell & Steifel, U.S. Tax Exemption for Foreign Governments,
International Organizations, Their Employees, 39 J. TAx. 108 (1973).
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